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Martin J. Conyon 64 Vand. L. Rev. 399 (2011)
This Article surveys recent empirical studies on the relation
between compensation consultants and CEO pay. The economic
rationale for using executive compensation consultants is that they
supply valuable data, information, and professional expertise to
client firms. However, critics argue that the consultant's
independence might be compromised because of conflicts of interest
arising from the cross selling of business services or because of the
consultant's desire to obtain repeat business. The emergent empirical
evidence suggests that pay consultants are important in explaining
executive compensation, although the findings are sometimes mixed
and the precise effects of consultants on pay are yet to be fully
understood.
In addition, this Article provides some new evidence on the
correlation between CEO pay and consultants using U.S. and U.K.
data. Adopting a slightly different approach to prior studies, I show
that there is a positive cross-section correlation between executive
pay and compensation consultants. Conditional on the estimation
strategy, the existing evidence supports the hypothesis that CEOs of
U.K. firms using consultants receive higher pay than those that do
not use compensation consultants. There is less evidence that firms
facing conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business services,
are associated with higher levels of CEO pay. However, the findings
may be sensitive to the type of estimation methods employed, and
addressing this concern is a challenge for future research. I also find
little support for the hypothesis that firms switch consultants as a
mechanism of increasing CEO pay. Again, interpreting the data is
fraught with difficulties because of selection effects and the
possibility of reverse causation.
Finally, the recent Dodd-Frank Act significantly upgrades
disclosure about executive compensation and compensation advisors.
Future research on the efficacy of compensation consultants will
undoubtedly take advantage of these new provisions. At present, it is
difficult to unambiguously conclude that pay consultants simply
promote executive interests at the expense of shareholders, or that
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I. INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation is a controversial subject, and it is
rarely far from the media's gaze. A popular view is that excess
compensation is pervasive, with corporate boards frequently awarding
overly generous pay packages to executives and Chief Executive
Officers ("CEOs"). The media has been very critical of Wall Street. As
the impact of the financial crisis deepened and Wall Street firms
received massive government bailouts, the bonuses received by
employees provoked widespread public outrage. Merrill Lynch and
American International Group ("AIG") were perceived as especially
controversial. In 2009 Merrill Lynch allocated $3.6 billion in bonuses
to its employees and AIG paid $218 million in bonuses.1 President
Barack Obama described Wall Street bonuses as "shameful."
2
Disapproval of executive compensation practices has been cast
much further. Recently, policymakers have outlined reforms of the
governance of executive pay. President Obama signed into law the far-
reaching Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act in July 2010. Its provisions include a regular non-mandatory
shareholder vote on executive compensation (so-called "say on pay")
and more requirements on information disclosure about the fees paid
to compensation consultants. 3  Generally, there seems to be
considerable popular concern as to whether current executive
compensation arrangements are consistent with shareholder and
societal interests.
CEOs do indeed earn high levels of pay. Executive pay has
increased considerably in the United States since the early 1990s.
John Core and Wayne Guay illustrate that median CEO compensation
in the S&P 500 firms has increased from approximately $2 million in
1993 to about $7.7 million in 2008.4 This corresponds to an annual
1. Mark Pittman & Christine Harper, Treasury Preserves Bank Payday with AIG Rescue
Cash, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive &sid=
aDYvjoj6a6ME&refer=home.
2. President Barack Obama criticized Wall Street corporate behavior, calling it "the height
of irresponsibility" for employees to be paid amounts of more than $18 billion in bonuses.
President Barack Obama, Remarks in Response to Wall Street Employee Bonuses (Jan. 29,
2009), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/29/obama-18b-in-wall-street_n.
162305.html. He added, "It is shameful .... What we're going to need is for the folks on Wall
Street who are asking for help to show some restraint, and show some discipline, and show some
sense of responsibility." Id.
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Act was signed into law by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010.
It extends beyond Wall Street and has significant implications for publicly listed firms.
4. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is CEO Pay Too High and Are Incentives Too Low? A
Wealth-Based Contracting Framework, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2010, at 5, 5-19.
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rate of growth of approximately 9.4 percent-a rate not achieved by
the typical U.S. worker. Indeed, other evidence shows that the gap
between CEO pay and typical worker pay has increased considerably
over time. Steven Kaplan documents that total pay of U.S. CEOs in
1993 was just under one hundred times greater than median
household income; in 2006 it was more than 200 times greater. 5 With
these facts in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that executive pay is
controversial.
How is CEO pay actually set? In practice, shareholders are
rarely involved in directly setting CEO pay, even though they are the
firm's owners. 6 Instead, the board of directors has the responsibility of
setting the pay of the CEO and other senior figures in the firm. Over
time many firms have delegated this role to the compensation
committee, a specialist committee of the board of directors.
Customarily, the compensation committee retains an expert executive
compensation consultant. The consultant provides data, advice, and
expert analysis to the firm. The board of directors makes the ultimate
decisions about executive pay. However, the use of executive pay
consultants is controversial. Critics contend that these consultants are
not sufficiently independent or impartial, and they lead to excess
compensation. Graef Crystal, a well-known critic of CEO pay
practices, asserts: "Executive compensation in the United States did
not go out of control simply through some random process; it went out
of control because of the actions-or inactions--of a number of parties.
The first culprits in what will be a litany of culprits are compensation
consultants ."7
Reports in the media are also often critical of compensation
consultants, suggesting that they do not provide sufficiently
independent advice.8 Other academics concur. Lucian Bebchuk and
5. Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., May 2008, at 5, 8-9;
see also, Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the
Rise in the Highest Incomes?, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1004, 1004-50 (2010) (analyzing the reasons for
and implications of the substantial increase in top executive pay over the past twenty-five years).
6. See Martin J. Conyon & Simon I. Peck, Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and
Top Management Compensation, 41 AcAD. MGMT. J. 146, 146-57 (1998) (discussing the limited
role of shareholders in setting the pay of CEOs).
7. Graef S. Crystal, Why CEO Compensation Is So High, CAL. MGMT. REV., Fall 1991, at 9,
9-29.
8. In 2004 Warren Buffet, the iconic investment guru, was reported as saying: 'The typical
large company has a compensation committee .... They don't look for Dobermans on that
committee, they look for chihuahuas." After pausing he then added, "Chihuahuas that have been
sedated." Jason Swieig, What Warren Buffet Wants You to Know, CNNMONEY.COM,
http://money.cnn.com/2004/05/03/pf/buffett-qanda/index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2011). Charles
Munger interjected, "I would rather throw a viper down my shirtfront than hire a compensation
consultant." Id.
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Jesse Fried, for example, argue that CEOs have significant power and
influence over the board of directors, leading to excess pay and
contracts that are not in shareholders' best interests.9 Do pay
consultants really lead to excessive pay, as critics contend? Or do they
help busy boards determine the optimal level and structure of CEO
pay as viewed from the shareholders' perspective?10
This Article surveys some recent empirical studies on the
relation between compensation consultants and CEO pay. The
literature finds that pay consultants are important in explaining
executive compensation, although the findings are sometimes mixed
and the precise effects of consultants on pay are yet to be fully
understood. Second, this Article provides some new evidence on the
correlation between CEO pay and consultants using U.S. and U.K.
data. Adopting a slightly different approach to prior studies, I show
that there is a positive cross-section correlation between executive pay
and compensation consultants. Based on existing data and the types of
estimation strategies, the existing evidence supports the hypothesis
that CEOs of U.K. firms using consultants receive higher pay than
those that do not use compensation consultants. However, the findings
may be sensitive to the type of estimation methods employed, and
addressing this concern is a challenge for future research." However,
I find that the evidence does not support the hypothesis that firms
switch consultants as a mechanism of increasing CEO pay. In
addition, interpreting the data is fraught with difficulties because of
selection effects and the possibility of reverse causation.
The rest of this Article is organized as follows. Part II provides
an overview of the role of executive compensation consultants. Part III
surveys some existing studies emanating from North America and the
United Kingdom. Part IV provides preliminary new evidence on the
relation between CEO pay and consultants. Finally, Part V contains a
summary and conclusion.
9. See LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION (2004); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M.
Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2006, at 5, 18.
10. A fundamental question is why executive pay has increased so much. A complete
answer is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses only on the relation between pay and
consultants. For recent analyses of the growth of executive pay, see generally Marianne
Bertrand, CEOs, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 121 (2009); Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive
Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099
(2010); Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q.J.
ECON. 49 (2008).
11. For example, when dynamic panel data ("DPD") analysis and propensity score methods
are applied to U.S. data, the effects of compensation consultants on CEO pay seem to be less
robust.
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II. COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS AND CEO PAY
A. Executive Compensation Consultants
Executive compensation consultants are organizations that
provide advice to the board of directors of client firms about senior
management pay.12 The consultants are generally retained by the
board of directors or alternatively by the management of the company.
However, several parties, including Representative Henry Waxman,
who served as Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform ('Waxman Committee") from 2007 to 2008,
perceived that compensation consultants were not sufficiently
independent. 13 The Waxman Committee investigation found that the
use of pay consultants is widespread. Specifically, it noted the
following:
Large companies routinely retain compensation consultants to provide advice on
executive pay, such as developing compensation peer groups, designing equity
compensation plans, conducting compensation surveys, and analyzing the tax,
accounting, and legal implications of specific pay packages. These consultants can be
retained by either the corporate board (typically, the compensation committee of the
board) or management, and they may advise the board, management, or both on
executive pay issues. Whether retained by the board or management, these consultants
can have a major impact on executive pay decisions.
14
In an earlier study, George Baker, Michael Jensen, and Kevin
Murphy documented the importance of consultants in setting pay in
executive labor markets.
15
Current information disclosure requirements about
compensation consultants are stringent in the United States, Canada,
and the United Kingdom. Strong disclosure requirements elsewhere
are not routinely mandated and are patchy, especially in continental
Europe. Since 2007, the United States has required disclosure of
compensation consultant information for public companies filing with
12. See Martin J. Conyon, Compensation Consultants and Executive Compensation, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 285, 285 (H. Kent
Baker & Ronald Anderson eds., 2010).
13. Role of Consultants in Executive Pay: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform), available at http://www.youtube.comlwatch?v=
dmvJZS9JJvw.
14. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, 110TH CONG.,
EXECUTIVE PAY: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS 5 (Comm. Print
2007) (prepared for Chairman Henry A. Waxman) [hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT].
15. George P. Baker et al., Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593




the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").16 Item 407(e) of the
regulations mandates that firms both identify the consultants and
disclose any role of compensation consultants in determining or
recommending the amount or form of executive and director
compensation. 17 In the United Kingdom, the Directors' Remuneration
Report Regulations of 2002 mandated that U.K. firms disclose
consultant information for financial years ending after December
2002.18 U.K. firms must name any person who provided material
advice or services to the compensation committee and must disclose
whether services in addition to compensation advice were given.19
Disclosure has been required in Canada since 2005. In April 2005, the
Canadian Securities Administrators issued National Instrument 58-
101 that requires corporations to disclose whether a firm has used a
compensation consultant. 20 As noted, requirements about the presence
and role of compensation consultants in continental European
countries and Asia are weak compared with North America and the
United Kingdom.
B. The Dodd-Frank Act
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, known as
the Dodd-Frank Act.21 The Act will affect all U.S. public companies,
far beyond financial services companies, by extending the regulation
relating to corporate governance and executive compensation.
Specifically, it will enhance U.S. disclosure in relation to executive
compensation consultants.
The Dodd-Frank Act requires firms to adopt new practices
regarding their compensation committees' independence and use of
compensation consultants, as well as other advisers to the board. It
16. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept.
8, 2006), available at http:lwww.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf (amending, among either
disclosure requirements, those for Form 10-K, Item 11 regarding executive compensation).
17. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(e) (2010) (setting forth amended requirements for disclosure of
executive compensation); see also SEC, Form 10-K, Item 11, available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/formlO-k.pdf (indicating that the firm must meet the reporting requirements of
section 229.407(e)).
18. See Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 1986 (U.K), available
at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20021986.htm.
19. Id., Regulation 3 & Schedule 7A (amending Companies Act, 1985 (U.I.).
20. Corporate Governance Rules, Nat'l Instrument No. 58-101 (2009) (Can.) available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.calen/SecuritiesLawrule_20050415_58-201-.gov-practices-l.jsp.
21. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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mandates that the national stock exchanges adopt listing standards
requiring that members of a listed company's compensation committee
meet enhanced independence standards. 22 Subtitle E (sections 951 to
957) of the Act deals with accountability and executive
compensation. 23  Section 952 requires the members of the
compensation committee to be independent, which takes into account
factors such as the source of compensation received by the member of
the board of directors, including any consulting, advisory, or other
compensatory fee paid to the member of the board of directors.24 In
addition, independence is assessed by whether a member of the board
of directors is affiliated with the issuer, a subsidiary, or an affiliate of
a subsidiary of the issuer.
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires an assessment of the
independence of the compensation consultant (and other advisors).
Compensation committees may only select their consultants (or other
advisors) after taking into account factors affecting the independence
of the potential committee adviser as specified by SEC rules. These
criteria include: other services that are provided, the amount of fees
that are paid to the advisor, business or personal relationships,
company stock held by the committee adviser, and conflicts of interest
policies and procedures. 25 In addition, the Act gives the compensation
committee sole discretion to retain or obtain the advice of a
compensation consultant.26 The compensation committee will be
directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight
of the work of a compensation consultant. In summary, the Dodd-
Frank Act significantly upgrades disclosure on executive
compensation and compensation advisors. Future research on the
22. Id. § 952(a) (adding to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10C, 15 U.S.C. § 78).
23. Id. §§ 951-57, at 1899-1907.
24. Id. § 952(a), at 1901 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78-j3).
25. Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act outlines independence criteria as follows:
(A) the provision of other services to the issuer by the person that employs the
compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser;
(B) the amount of fees received from the issuer by the person that employs the
compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser, as a percentage of the total
revenue of the person that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or
other adviser;
(C) the policies and procedures of the person that employs the compensation
consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser that are designed to prevent conflicts of
interest;
(D) any business or personal relationship of the compensation consultant, legal
counsel, or other adviser with a member of the compensation committee; and
(E) any stock of the issuer owned by the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or
other adviser.
Id.
26. Id. § 952, at 1902.
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efficacy of compensation consultants will undoubtedly take advantage
of these new provisions.
C. Compensation Consulting Firms
Prior to 2010 there were six leading compensation consultants
in the United States: Frederick W. Cook & Company, Hewitt
Associates, Mercer Human Resources Consulting, Pearl Meyer &
Partners, Towers Perrin, and Watson Wyatt. Studies show that these
organizations account for the majority of the constituents listed on the
major stock market indexes, such as the S&P 500. In June 2009,
Towers Perrin and Watson Wyatt announced a friendly merger, which
was subsequently approved by shareholders and regulatory agencies.
Towers Watson was formed in January 2010.27 The merger
established a large employee-benefits consulting firm. The "big six"
had become the "big five."
Table 1 shows the prevalence of executive compensation
consultants in the United States. The five leading consultants advise
seventy percent of all firms in the S&P 1500, over three-quarters of
the constituents of the S&P 500, and over sixty percent of the Russell
3000 index. 28 Towers Watson is (now) the market leader, and advises
approximately one-quarter of firms in each of the S&P 1500, the S&P
500, and the Russell 3000.29 The market for executive compensation
services is a structural oligopoly: a few firms supply executive
compensation services to many client firms. This fact does not
necessarily suggest that the market configuration is against the social
interest or adversely impacts the welfare of the client firm's owners.
The presence of economies of scale, market expertise, or both is one
plausible explanation for the observed distribution of executive
compensation consulting firms.
27. History, TOWERS WATSON, http://www.towerswatson.com/about/1443 (last visited Jan.
23, 2011). Historically, Towers Watson is the successor of the oldest actuarial firm in the world,
R. Watson & Sons, which was formed in the United Kingdom in 1878. B.E. Wyatt founded The
Wyatt Company as an actuarial consulting firm in the United States in 1946. The two firms
formed a global alliance under the brand Watson Wyatt Worldwide in 1995. Towers, Perrin,
Forster & Crosby was established in the United States in 1934. In 1987 the company shortened
its name to Towers Perrin.
28. EQUILAR, INC., 2010 CONSULTANT LEAGUE REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSULTANT
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Table 1. Executive Compensation Consultants in the United States
Consulting Firm S&P 1500 S&P 500 Russell 3000
Towers Watson 24.5 26.4 22.3
Frederic W. Cook & Co 15.1 22.1 13.0
Hewitt Associates 11.5 12.2 9.3
Mercer 10.7 9.8 10.5
Pearl Meyer & Partners 7.2 5.9 7.2
Hay Group 2.9 n.a 3.2
Compensia 2.7 2.4 4.3
Semler Brossy Consulting 2.7 5.0 2.2
Radford 2.3 n.a n.a
Deloitte Consulting 1.3 1.3 n.a
Exequity 1.3 2.0 n.a
Source: Equilar 2010 Consultant League Report: An Analysis of Consultant Engagement
Prevalence. The firm Towers Watson is the result of a merger between Towers Perrin and
Watson Wyatt in January 2010. See http://www.equilar.com/ for further information.
Studies show that these executive compensation consultant
firms are also dominant in other counties. Murphy and Sandino show
that Towers Perrin and Mercer Consulting are major consulting firms
in the Canadian market.30 Towers Perrin and Mercer are also leading
consultants in the U.K. market, in addition to New Bridge Street. It is
assumed that Towers Perrin also has a significant presence in other
continental European markets, but systematic evidence is scarce due
to weaker disclosure rules in those countries. These large consulting
firms have an important presence in Australia as well.
31
D. The Role of Executive Compensation Consultants
The economic rationale for using executive compensation
consultants is that they supply valuable data, information, and
professional expertise to client firms. Kevin Murphy and Tatiana
Sandino suggest the following role for consultants:
30. Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay and "Independent" Compensation
Consultants, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 247, 250 (2010).
31. I am grateful to Professor Kym Sheehan at Sydney Law School for information about
compensation consultants in Australia. The role and influence of pay consultants in Australia
appears to share similar attributes to those discussed in this Article.
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[Firms] rely on executive compensation consultants to make recommendations on
appropriate pay levels, to design and implement short-term and long-term incentive
arrangements, and to provide survey and competitive-benchmarking information on
industry and market pay practices. In addition, consultants are routinely asked to opine
on existing compensation arrangements and to give general guidance on change-in-
control and employment agreements, as well as on complex and evolving accounting,
tax, and regulatory issues related to executive pay.
3 2
In the economics, or contracting, view, firms use consultants to
better align the interests of CEOs and firms, and hence lower agency
costs. By retaining a professional compensation consultant, the firm
can design an optimal compensation contract at a lower cost than
devising the pay plan itself.33 According to this view, consultants are
experts, helping boards and compensation committees understand the
value of complex pay packages and associated tax, disclosure, and
accounting issues.34 Compensation consultants lower agency costs and
help solve the latent principal-agent problem. Resulting pay contracts
are optimal for shareholders (and other stakeholders) and lead to
better alignment of pay with performance.
Within this framework, the role of executive compensation
consultants is seemingly uncontroversial. The consultant's task is
purely functional, ensuring that pay is effectively linked to
performance and that shareholder interests are optimized.
Consultants are controversial, however, and are frequently blamed for
contributing to excessive pay. The core criticism is that consultants
are not sufficiently independent or impartial and this leads to pay
packages that are not optimal from the shareholders' perspective.
32. Murphy & Sandino, supra note 30, at 247.
33. See Baker et al., supra note 15, at 613-15 (discussing inefficiencies in compensation
arrangements at large firms).
34. Executive compensation consultants themselves (not surprisingly) also stress their
central role in aligning the interests of executives with owners. Towers Watson asserts that:
A well.designed executive compensation program should encourage leaders to take
appropriate risks to achieve key business objectives and align pay with performance.
Towers Watson can help you develop plans that fit the needs of your organization-
balancing the views of shareholders, executives and other stakeholders. We work with
you to select the right performance metrics and goals-beyond just total returns to
shareholders-and to deliver the right mix of incentives to drive performance and
retain experienced leaders.
Talents and Rewards: Executive Compensation, TOWERS WATSON, http://www.towerswatson.com/
services/Executive-Compensation (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
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E. The Independence of Compensation Consultants
1. Cross Selling of Other Services
The Waxman Committee inquiry argued that consultant
independence and impartiality might be compromised, leading
consultants to give biased advice to clients. Specifically, the
Committee was concerned about conflicts arising from the cross selling
of business services:
Corporate consultants can have a financial conflict of interest if they provide both
executive compensation advice and other services to the same company. According to
experts on corporate governance, consultants hired by corporate executives to
administer employee benefit plans or -to provide other services to a company may not be
able to provide objective advice about the compensation of the executives who hire
them.
3 5
The implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 will require firms
to address more carefully the issue of independence.
Using data from 2006, the Waxman Committee concluded that
conflicts of interest among consultants were pervasive. The Committee
found that at least 113 of the Fortune 250 companies received
executive pay advice from consultants that were providing other
services to the company.36 Murphy and Sandino, using publicly
available U.S. data, report a lower figure (approximately twelve
percent).37  However, this might be an underestimate because
disclosure of other services supplied by the consultant in U.S. proxy
statements is not mandated. Notably, at least two executive
compensation consultants (Frederic W. Cook and Pearl Meyer) are
specialized firms and do not supply other business services to their
clients, and therefore may be considered as independent. In the
United Kingdom, Martin Conyon, Simon Peck, and Graham Sadler
find that about forty-five percent of firms supply other business to
client firms.38 Importantly, and in contrast to U.S. firms, U.K. firms
are mandated to report this information in the annual report and
accounts.
The Waxman inquiry also found that compensation consultants
of Fortune 250 firms were paid almost eleven times more for providing
other services than they were paid for providing executive
compensation advice. The mean payment was about $2.3 million for
35. WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at i.
36. Id.
37. Murphy & Sandino, supra note 30, at 252.
38. Martin J. Conyon et al., Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from
the United States and the United Kingdom, 23 AcAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2009, at 43, 51.
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other services and less than $220,000 for executive compensation
advice. 39 Implicitly, this questions the consultant's impartiality when
offering executive compensation advice. In general, the fees
consultants received for executive compensation advice and for other
services are not voluntarily reported by U.S. firms. The Waxman
Committee had unique access to proprietary information. However,
Canadian firms do report these data. Murphy and Sandino report that
the ratio of fees for other non-executive pay services to fees for
executive compensation advice is approximately one to thirteen.40 In
the case of the United Kingdom, the ratio of fees from other non-
executive pay services to executive pay fees is not reported by firms in
annual reports or other shareholder documents. Although somewhat
imprecise due to the lack of systematic data, the overall picture
suggests that consultants earn far more from their non-executive
compensation services relative to their executive compensation advice.
Because of this, there is a concern that the consultant's advice may
not be sufficiently impartial.
2. Repeat Business
Murphy and Sandino suggest (but ultimately reject) the
argument that the consultant's desire to generate "repeat business"
may also compromise independence. 41 Bebchuk and Fried have taken
this argument more seriously. They claim that "[c]ompensation
consultants have strong incentives to use their discretion to benefit
the CEO. . . . Providing advice that hurts the CEO's pocketbook is
hardly a way to enhance the consultant's chances of being hired in the
future by this firm or, indeed, by any other firms."42 If the consultant
recommends a compensation package below the CEO's expectations,
then presumably the probability that the consultant will be
terminated increases. In addition, the likelihood that the consultant
will be offered business from other clients falls.43 Consultants who fear
being fired, losing repeat business, or both are more likely to
recommend pay contracts that favor the CEO at the expense of
shareholders.
One potential constraint on overtly self-serving consultant
behavior is the desire to maintain a professional reputation. A
39. WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at i.
40. Murphy & Sandino, supra, note 30, at 252.
41. Id. at 248.
42. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,
17 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2003, at 71, 78-79.
43. Id.
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compensation consultant who is exposed as colluding with
management, or recommending lucrative pay deals for poor
performance, will suffer a loss of valuable market reputation. In
addition, the consultant may risk termination by the client firm's
board of directors, fail to attract and retain assignments at other
firms, or even risk litigation.
How close are the ties between pay consultants and
management? Although these ties are difficult for researchers to
properly observe, some studies cast some light on the interactions
between boards and consultants. Murphy and Sandino, for example,
report that in about forty-one percent of U.S. firms employing
compensation consultants, the consultant works exclusively for the
board or compensation committee. 44 In addition, they find that about
forty-five percent of firms' proxy statements refer to the pay
consultant as "independent. '45 In the United Kingdom, Conyon, Peck,
and Sadler report that in about fifty percent of firms studied, the
compensation committee retains the consultant. 46 With the passage of
the Dodd-Frank Act, a more accurate picture will emerge of consultant
independence and their relation to management and boards.
III. PRIOR COMPENSATION CONSULTANT STUDIES
A. U.S. and Canada Studies
Murphy and Sandino examine the relation between CEO pay
and compensation consultants in a sample of U.S. and Canadian
firms, controlling for other economic determinants of executive
compensation. 47 Their U.S. sample consists of 1,341 companies,
distributed across the S&P 500 index (408 firms), the S&P Mid Cap
(291 firms), the S&P Small Cap (382 firms), and some additional firms
in year 2006-2007. Their Canadian sample consists of 124 firms for
the fiscal year 2006.
Murphy and Sandino test whether consultants supplying
"other business" lead to greater CEO pay at client firms. They find
evidence both in the United States and Canada that CEO pay is
higher in companies where the consultant provides other services. In
addition, they find that CEO pay is higher in Canadian firms in cases
44. Murphy & Sandino, supra note 30, at 251.
45. Id.
46. Martin J. Conyon et al., New Perspectives on the Governance of Executive Compensation:
An Examination of the Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants, 15 J. MGMT. &
GOVERNANCE 29 (2011).
47. Murphy & Sandino, supra, note 30, at 249.
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where the fees paid to consultants for other services are large
compared to the fees received for executive compensation services.
This supports the hypothesis that potential conflicts of interest faced
by consultants lead to greater agency costs. Murphy and Sandino also
test the "repeat business" hypothesis, and investigate whether CEO
pay is higher when the consultant works for management rather than
for the board of directors. They find, contrary to expectations, that
U.S. CEO pay is actually higher in the cases where the consultant
works for the board rather than for management.
Murphy and Sandino evaluate the robustness of their findings
by augmenting their ordinary least squares ("OLS") estimates with a
statistical propensity score analysis to correct for the endogenous
selection of the compensation consultant. Propensity score matching
methods are used to compare like-for-like firms when comparing pay
differences between firms that use consultants and those that do not.
They find that differences in CEO pay become insignificant when
comparing firms where the consultants provide "other services" to an
optimally matched set of firms not providing such other services. In
addition, their sensitivity analysis confirms their earlier finding that
CEO pay is greater in firms where the board hires the consultant,
rather than management. The authors provide a discussion of their
propensity score approach, noting that their statistical model
predicting the decision to retain a consultant has poor explanatory
power. However, the additional results do seem to show that finding
an effect of consultants on CEO pay may be sensitive to the statistical
estimation method used by researchers.
Brian Cadman, Mary Ellen Carter, and Steven Hillegeist also
investigate whether CEO pay is higher in firms when the executive
compensation consultant supplies cross-selling services. 48 Their
sample consists of 755 firms from the S&P 1500 in the fiscal year
2006. They argue that consultants may give biased advice to secure
greater revenues from their clients when other business services are
supplied. Consultants are deemed independent if the client firm uses
Pearl Meyer or Frederick W. Cook, since these consultants did not
supply other non-executive pay services to clients. The authors are
unable to isolate a significantly robust relation between pay and the
presence of conflicted consultants. They conclude: "Overall, we do not
find evidence suggesting that potential conflicts of interest associated
48. Brian Cadman et al., The Incentives of Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay, 49 J.
AcCT. & ECON. 263, 263 (2010).
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with the much criticized cross-selling incentives [between the firm and
its consultant] are a primary driver of excessive CEO pay."
49
Christopher Armstrong, Christopher Ittner, and David Larcker
study approximately 2,000 U.S. firms in the fiscal year 2006 and
investigate the effects of consultants on CEO pay.50 The sample is
substantially larger than other U.S. studies. They find that "CEO pay
is generally higher in clients of most consulting firms, even after
controlling for economic determinants of compensation."5 1 They find
that most firms use compensation consultants (almost ninety percent).
In addition, the authors find that users and nonusers, matched by
economic and governance characteristics, do not have significantly
different pay levels. Overall, Armstrong and colleagues find little
evidence that CEO pay is higher in firms using consultants who
potentially offer additional non-compensation related services.
Conyon, Peck, and Sadler investigate the relation between
CEO pay and compensation consultants. 2 Their sample consists of
308 U.S. firms from the S&P 500 in 2006 and 231 large U.K. firms in
2003. They find the level of CEO pay is positively correlated with the
presence of consultants in both the United States and the United
Kingdom. In addition, they show that the mix of CEO pay, defined as
the fraction of equity pay in total CEO compensation, is greater in
firms that use consultants. One interpretation of the data is that pay
consultants recommend greater pay-at-risk for the CEOs of client
firms, reflecting greater pay-for-performance. The authors further
note that risk-averse CEOs whose contracts contain more risky
compensation such as stock options will demand greater levels of
pay.5 3 Their results may suggest that higher CEO pay associated with
the presence of pay consultants is part of an efficient contract and not
due to upward pay pressures promulgated by non-independent
advisors.
49. Id. at 280.
50. Christopher S. Armstrong et al., Economic Characteristics, Corporate Governance, and
the Influence of Compensation Consultants on Executive Pay Levels 13 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate
Governance, Working Paper No. 15, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1145548.
51. Id. at 1.
52. Conyon et al., supra, note 38, at 50-51.
53. Id.; see also Nuno G. Fernandes et al., The Pay Divide: (Why) Are U.S. Top Executives
Paid More? 25 (ECGI Fin., Working Paper No. 255/2009, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341639 ("CEOs in the U.S. receive a much larger fraction of their pay
through equity-based pay (primarily stock options and restricted shares), thus helping to explain
the observed U.S. pay premium."); Martin J. Conyon et al., Are US CEOS Paid More than UK
CEOS? Inferences from Risk-Adjusted Pay 14 (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=907469 ("[W]e show that US CEOs have more wealth at risk in their
companies' stock and stock options relative to UK CEOs.").
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In related research, Paul Andr6, Samer Khalil, and Michel
Magnan investigate the determinants of deferred compensation plans
for corporate outside directors, as opposed to insiders. 54 They address
the incentives of outsiders to perform their monitoring function by
using data from approximately 130 Canadian firms over the time
period 1997 to 2005. They show that the likelihood of firms adopting a
deferred share unit plan for outside directors is greater in firms that
retain a compensation consultant compared to those that do not. One
interpretation of this result is that consultants promote incentives for
active board monitoring. The authors also show that about fifty-six
percent of their sample firms use pay consultants.
B. U.K Studies
Lisa Goh and Aditi Gupta investigate compensation
consultants and executive pay in a large sample of U.K. firms between
2002 and 2008.55 Similar to other studies, they find the use of
compensation consultants is widespread. Also, they demonstrate that
both the level of executive pay and the proportion of equity-based pay
are higher in client firms that retain compensation consultants. Again,
this is consistent with prior studies. Importantly, Goh and Gupta
study the effect of changes in compensation consultants on changes in
executive pay. They hypothesize that firms may engage in "opinion
shopping."56 That is, firms may shop in the market for executive
compensation advice for opinions that favor the CEO over
shareholders. Using a sample of Financial Times Stock Exchange
firms (the "FTSE 350") from 2002 to 2008, they find mixed evidence on
the effect of changing consultants on executive pay.
Goh and Gupta find that CEOs and executives of firms that
switch their main consultant receive higher salary increases in the
year of the switch, consistent with opinion shopping. However, they
find little evidence that switching consultants leads to greater changes
in total pay, a figure that includes stock options. Rather, the authors
find that executives at firms switching consultants receive less risky
compensation packages measured as a lower proportion of equity pay,
54. Paul Andr6 et al., The Adoption of Deferred Share Unit Plans for Outside Directors:
Economic and Social Determinants, J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at
1), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/935ql4O441wr
2 43 m.
55. Lisa Goh & Aditi Gupta, Executive Compensation, Compensation Consultants, and
Shopping for Opinion: Evidence from the UK, J. ACOT. AUDITING & FIN. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 21), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1577925.
56. Id. at 14-15. The accounting literature discusses "opinion shopping' in the context of
firms shopping for favorable audit opinions. See Clive Lennox, Do Companies Successfully
Engage in Opinion Shopping? Evidence from the UK, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 321, 322 (2000).
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which is more favorable to the executive. They also find that
executives of consultant-switching firms receive a greater proportion
of bonus pay. In contrast, firms that simply increase the number of
consultants (as opposed to switching) do not have higher increases in
compensation. Overall, the authors conclude that there is some
evidence that companies successfully practice opinion shopping.
Rezaul Kabir and Marizah Minhat analyze 175 companies
between 2003 and 2006.57 They find statistical evidence that executive
compensation is higher when firms use multiple consultants. Further,
they find that high market share of the compensation consultants has
a significant and positive effect on CEO compensation. Georgios
Voulgaris, Konstantinos Stathopoulos, and Martin Walker investigate
the relation between CEO pay and compensation consultants in a
sample of 500 U.K. firms in 2006.58 Approximately one-third of these
firms do not retain consultants. The use of a consultant is much more
likely in larger, more complex firms. Consistent with other research,
they find that CEO pay is positively correlated with the presence of a
compensation consultant and that the ratio of equity pay to total pay
is higher in firms using consultants. Interestingly, the proportion of
salary in total pay is lower. This finding suggests that consultants not
only raise the level of pay but also design contracts that contain more
risk (equity pay) and less insurance (salary pay), consistent with
shareholder goals. This study, together with that by Lisa Goh and
Aditi Gupta, illustrates that consultants can affect both the level and
structure of CEO pay.
In a separate study, Conyon, Peck, and Sadler investigate the
role of compensation consultant networks in their sample of U.K.
firms. 59 They find that CEO pay is positively correlated with CEO pay
in peer firms that used the same consultant as the focal firm. They
also find the level of CEO compensation in the focal firm is positively
related to the number of board interlocks created by both a shared
director and a shared compensation consultant. Overall, their study
suggests that management social networks are important for
executive pay outcomes and are facilitated by the presence of
compensation consultants.
In contrast to the many multivariate statistical studies, Ruth
Bender conducts an in-depth qualitative study of compensation
57. Rezaul Kabir and Marizah Minhat, The Effect of Compensation Consultants on UK CEO
Pay 14 (May 31, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646926.
58. Georgios Voulgaris et al., Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay: UK Evidence, 18
CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. 51, 515 (2010).
59. Martin J. Conyon et al., supra note 46, at 29.
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consultants.60 She analyzes twelve U.K. companies selected from the
FTSE 350. Thirty-five CEOs, remuneration committee chairs, and
compensation consultants were interviewed between 2001 and 2003.
The qualitative approach provides rich detail on the process of setting
boardroom pay and in particular the role of the consultant. The
findings are grouped into five substantive areas: (1) how companies
choose their consultants; (2) the consultant as an expert; (3) the
consultant as an intermediary between the board and other
stakeholders; (4) the consultant as a legitimating device; and (5)
conflicts of interest and the use of multiple consultants. A number of
salient findings emerge. First, consultants act as experts providing
data, advising on plan design, and acting as a liaison with
institutional investors. Second, consultants provide legitimacy to the
decisions made by the compensation committee. Consultants give
credence to the compensation committee and human resources
decisions about pay. Third, consultants are aware that their
independence may be seen to be compromised and are taking steps to
remedy this issue. For example, one potential option is that the
remuneration committee retains its own separate compensation
consultant. Bender also reports that U.K. policymakers are
recommending that consultants adopt a code of "best practice" to
mitigate conflicts of interest in the future.
C. Other Studies
A number of empirical studies examine the role of pay
consultants before 2000. Typically, non-publicly available data were
used. James Wade, Joseph Porac, and Timothy Pollock investigate the
role of compensation consultants using proprietary U.S. data.61 They
argue that firms use consultants to provide legitimacy for executive
pay outcomes, and find that firms justify high CEO pay by discussing
the use of a compensation consultant in the proxy statement. Henry
Tosi and Luis Gomez-Mejia investigate the role of pay consultants
using data from the United States. 62 Unlike later studies, Tosi and
Gomez-Mejia's analysis is based on surveys administered directly to
firms. They find that consultants were important actors in setting pay.
Similarly, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia show elsewhere that consultants are
60. Ruth Bender, Paying For Advice: The Role of the Remuneration Consultant in U.K.
Listed Companies, 64 VAND. L. REV. 361 (2011).
61. James B. Wade et al., Worth, Words, and the Justification of Executive Pay, 18 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 641, 648 (1997).
62. Henry L. Tosi & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance: An
Agency Theory Perspective, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 169, 174 (1989).
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important in the construction of their index of monitoring and
alignment.63 Nancy Thorley Hill and Kevin Stevens survey one
hundred U.S. outside directors to investigate how CEOs are
compensated. They find that retaining a compensation consultant is
one method to effectively link CEO compensation to long-term
rewards. 64
IV. CONSULTANTS AND CEO PAY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A. Consultants and U.K CEO Pay
This Article presents further preliminary empirical results on
the relation between CEO pay and compensation consultants using
U.K. data. The data are derived from the sample used by Conyon,
Peck, and Sadler.65 A standard linear CEO pay equation is estimated.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of CEO compensation. Total
CEO compensation is measured as the sum of salary, bonus, benefits,
stock options, 66 restricted stock, and other compensation. Three
indicator variables (which can take the values of either zero or one)
are used for the compensation consultant: (i) if the company uses a
compensation consultant, (ii) if the consultant supplies any other
business to the client firm, and (iii) if the compensation committee
appoints the compensation consultant.
A set of control variables is also included in the regression
model to control for other economics and governance determinants of
CEO pay: the logarithm of firm sales is included as an indicator of
firm complexity; the book to market variable (book value of assets
divided by the market value of the company) controls for firm growth
opportunities; firm performance is measured as shareholder returns
(stock price appreciation plus dividends over three years); firm risk is
the firm's stock price volatility (the annualized standard deviation in
stock prices); and job tenure (measured in years) and CEO age control
63. Henry L. Tosi & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, CEO Compensation Monitoring and Firm
Performance, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1002, 1008 tbl.1 (1994). They asked firms to state the level of
agreement with the following propositions: "[i]t is in the interest of hired compensation
consultants to recommend a high compensation package for the CEO," and "[iut is in the interest
of hired compensation consultants to recommend a pay with a low downside risk for the CEO."
Id.
64. Nancy Thorley Hill & Kevin Stevens, CEO Compensation and Corporate Performance,
24 J. GEN. MGMT. 65, 65-67 (1995).
65. Conyon et al., supra note 38.
66. The value of the stock options is measured at the grant date using the modified Black-
Scholes formula for stock paying dividends. See Fisher Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of
Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 637-54 (1973).
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for human capital. The regressions also contain industry dummy
variables to allow for cross-industry variation in the demand for
managerial talent.
Table 2 contains the findings from various linear regression
models. Columns 1 to 4 present OLS estimates, with standard errors
clustered on individual consultants. Columns 5 to 8 estimate the same
pay equations using robust regression methods. This technique is used
to weight potential outliers in the data. 67 Columns 1 and 2
demonstrate a positive correlation between CEO total pay and the
presence of a consultant. CEO salary is also positively correlated with
the presence of a consultant. The results control for other economic
and governance determinants of CEO pay, and are in broad agreement
with other recent research. As noted, the standard errors are adjusted
based on clustering on the consulting firm because different consulting
firms may offer different pay strategies and advice. In Column 1, total
CEO pay is approximately twenty-six percent higher in firms using
consultants. 68 Columns 3 and 4 show some evidence that CEO pay is
higher in firms whose consultants supply other business to the client
firm. CEO salary is estimated to be about seven percent higher in
such firms, conditional on having retained a consultant. Columns 5 to
8 show that the results are not generally sensitive to the estimation
method. The robust regression results confirm a positive correlation
between CEO pay and consultants. However, there is some variation
in the estimated effects of other business and compensation consultant
on pay.
67. Implemented in Stata version 11.1 using the "rreg" command.
68. Calculated as e. 2 3 -1.
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Table 2. Consultants and CEO Pay in the United Kingdom
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ordinary Least Squares models Robust regression models
Variables Log Log Log Log Log Log Log Log
CEO Salary CEO Salary CEO Salary CEO Salary
Pay Pay Pay Pay
Consultant 0.23* 0.08"* 0.36"* 0.10"























(0.10) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04)
0.26** 0.18*" 0.24"" 0.18* 0.24"*" 0.18" 0.23- 0.17..
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
-0.45* -0.27* -0.45" -0.30- -0.23 -0.18"* -0.33* -0.19**
(0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.19) (0.08) (0.19) (0.08)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.10 -0.09 -0.04 -0.15 0.03 -0.11 -0.04 -0.14
(0.18) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11) (0.25) (0.11) (0.26) (0.11)
-0.00* 0.01* -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01"
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
5.15"" 4.31"* 5.25** 4.28*** 4.84"* 4.33*** 5.08. 4.34*
(0.22) (0.26) (0.19) (0.28) (0.40) (0.18) (0.41) (0.18)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
229 229 209 209 229 229 209 209
0.325 0.501 0.318 0.520 0.321 0.561 0.318 0.583
The sample consists of 229 U.K. firms in 2003. CEO pay is the sum of salary, bonus, Black-
Scholes value of stock option grants, restricted stock grants, and other pay, Equity pay mix is
equity pay (the value of options and restricted stock) divided by CEO pay. "Consultant" is an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a consultant and zero otherwise. "Consultant
supplies other business," and "compensation committee appoints the consultant" are also
indicator variables. "Consultant supplies other business" is an indicator variable equal to one if
the consultant provides services other than remuneration advice to the focal firm. "Log sales" is
the logarithm of firm sales revenues. "Book to market" is the book value of assets divided by the
market value of the company. "Shareholder returns" are stock price appreciation plus dividends
over three years. "Volatility" is the annualized standard deviation in stock prices. "Job tenure" is
executive time in office (years). "CEO age" is the executive's age (years). Robust standard errors
are in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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B. Consultants and U.S. CEO Pay
The relation between U.S. CEO pay and consultants is
investigated using panel data methods. The sample is based on the
constituents of the S&P 500 index. Data on the identity of the
consultant used by each firm was collected from 2006 to 2008,
inclusive. This short panel of data has advantages over cross-section
studies-it permits an investigation of the effect of a change in
compensation consultant on the change in CEO pay. Namely, the
within-firm CEO pay variation can be exploited by comparing firms
that change consultants to those that do not. One prediction is that
firms that change their consultant would lead to greater levels of CEO
pay due to "opinion shopping," as described by Goh and Gupta.69 The
dynamic panel data ("DPD") method eliminates firm fixed effects that
potentially contaminate OLS estimates of the relation between CEO
pay and consultants. The fixed effects cater for any unobserved time-
invariant missing variables. In the short run, managerial quality
might be considered as such a variable. Consider the model:
yit = ai + Xyi,t-1 + Pxit + 8consultantit + qt + Eit(1)
The term yit is CEO compensation in firm i at time period t; xit
is a set of variables that determine pay, such as firm performance and
size; nt are a vector of time-period effects; and cit is an error term. The
equation contains a set of firm fixed effects (ai) and a lagged
dependent variable, yit-1. The model is estimated by differencing the
data between t and t-1 and using the Arellano and Bond generalized
method of moments ("GMM") DPD estimator.
70
Two CEO compensation measures are used. First, the
logarithm of CEO total pay, where total pay is the sum of salary,
bonus, other cash pay, restricted stock grants, and the Black-Scholes
69. Goh & Gupta, supra note 55 (manuscript at 11-12).
70. The estimator used is described in Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, Some Tests of
Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment
Equations, 58 REV. ECON. STUD. 277, 277-97 (1991); see also Stephen J. Nickell, Biases in
Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1417, 1417-26 (1981) (discussing
dynamic panel data models with fixed effects). The Arellano-Bond DPD estimator is suited to
panels with few time series observations (short T) and relatively more frequent cross-section
observations (large N). Independence across observations is assumed. Prior studies often impose
the restriction that X = 0, which is relaxed here. Since the first-difference procedure induces an
MA(1) error term, the OLS estimates of ) on the lagged dependent variable are biased. Instead,
the model is estimated using GMM instrumental variable ("IV') techniques. The induced MA(1)
structure implies that under the null of no serial correlation valid instruments are those dated at
t-2 and earlier.
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value of option grants.71 The second is the logarithm of CEO salary.
The econometric models contain a one-period lag of the dependent
variable. The independent variables are consistent with prior research
on CEO compensation. The models include the logarithm of firm sales.
Firm performance variables are included to measure the potential
alignment of owner and manager interest. These are total returns to
shareholders (share price appreciation plus dividends), the firm's
return on assets, and the trading profit margin. This set of variables
captures the firm's market and accounting performance.
72
Compensation consultant data were collected from the proxy
statements of the constituents of the S&P 500 firms.73 Firms report
the name of the pay consultant for each of the years 2006 to 2008,
inclusive. The consultant data is coded as zero for no change in status
and one for change in status. For example, if a company that used
Towers Perrin in 2007 and changed to Frederick Cook in 2008, it is
coded as one. If Towers Perrin was used in both years, the variable is
coded as zero. The number of recorded changes is actually relatively
infrequent (and this should be borne in mind when interpreting the
results). For the fiscal year 2008, we identified fourteen companies in
the S&P 500 that changed consultants between 2007 and 2008. This
was about three percent of the available observations. For the fiscal
year 2007, there were twenty-two changes between 2006 and 2007,
representing about 4.5 percent of the observations. Firms changing
consultants in 2008 were not the same as firms changing consultants
in 2007. In summary, turnover of consultants is infrequent.
The Hershey Company provides a concrete example of how a
company might report the change of consultant in the proxy
statement. It changed consultants from Towers Perrin in 2007 to
Mercer in 2008, stating clearly in its proxy statement: "The
Committee engaged Mercer to succeed Towers Perrin, an executive
compensation consulting firm who had provided such services to the
Committee in prior years."74 The narrative in proxy statements was
71. This is item TDC1 in the Execucomp database.
72. This set of right-hand side variables is necessarily parsimonious, but sufficient given
that the dynamic panel data fixed-effects model permits testing the effect of consultants on CEO
pay.
73. Data were entered independently by different researchers and compared and checked
for coding errors.
74. In this case, the proxy further states:
During 2008, the Committee engaged Mercer (US) Inc. ('Mercer"), an executive
compensation consultant, to provide independent assistance to the Committee with
respect to the Committee's development and refinement of our compensation policies
and the Committee's assessment of whether our compensation programs support our
business objectives, are market competitive and are cost efficient. The Committee
engaged Mercer to succeed Towers Perrin, an executive compensation consulting firm
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used to code the year-on-year change in consultant. The effect of any
change in consultant on subsequent change in CEO pay was then
determined.
Estimates from the DPD model are contained in Table 3.
Columns 1 and 2 contain a parsimonious CEO pay equation estimated
over the period 1992 to 2008 for the CEOs of the constituents of the
S&P 500. This is the benchmark model. In Columns 3 and 4, the
models are estimated over the period 2005 to 2008 and include the pay
consultant variable. The hypothesis is that firms that change their
consultant lead to higher levels of CEO pay at client firms. 75 There is
little evidence in support of this hypothesis. After controlling for
persistence in CEO pay, firm size, firm performance, macroeconomic
shocks, as well as unobserved firm fixed effects, the coefficient
estimate (5) is insignificant in all specifications (Columns 3 and 4).
This new evidence does not support the view that firms switch
consultants as a mechanism to increase CEO pay.
who had provided such services to the Committee in prior years and did so during the
first two months of 2008 when the Committee made decisions and took actions
relating to 2008 director and executive officer compensation levels and awards.
Hershey Co., Official Notification to Shareholders of Matters to Be Brought to a Vote 16 (Form
DEF 14A) (Mar. 16, 2009).
75. It is expected that 8 > 0.
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Table 3. Consultants and CEO Pay in the United States
















































The sample consists of constituents of the S&P 500 between 1992 and 2008. Compensation data
derived from Execucomp. The dependent variable (yit) is logarithm of total CEO pay (Columns 1
and 3) and CEO salary (Columns 2 and 4). Total pay is the sum of salary, bonus, other cash pay,
restricted stock grants, and the Black-Scholes value of option grants. Log of "firms sales" are
company revenues during the year. "Stock returns" are measured as capital appreciated plus
dividends reinvested. "Profit margin" is net income divided by company sales; "return on assets"
is measured as profit to total assets during the year. "Pay consultant" is the presence (identity) of
the pay consultant (for example, Mercer, Towers Perrin, etc.) S1 and S2 are t-tests of first and
second order serial correlation, respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. These are one-step Arellano-Bond measures: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
Other features of the dynamic pay equations are worth
stressing. First, the lagged dependent variable in all pay equations is
positive and significant-previous levels of CEO pay are important for
determining current CEO pay. The significance of this variable
warrants further studies on CEO wage dynamics. Second, CEO
salaries appear much more persistent than total pay. This is intuitive:
salaries are "fixed" and contain inertia, whereas total pay contains
variable pay such as bonuses and options and are more discretionary.
Third, because of persistence in CEO pay, the long-run effect of
company size is different from the short-run effect. In Column 1, the






















































about 0.37. In Column 2, the short-run size elasticity is 0.16 and the
long-run size elasticity is about 0.46.76
C. Discussion
Prior studies have documented a positive correlation between
CEO pay and compensation consultants. The preliminary new results
in this Article agree. Generally, it is possible to identify a positive
cross-sectional association between CEO pay and the presence of a
consultant, especially in the U.K. data. In addition, there is some
evidence that CEO pay is greater in firms where consultants are
potentially conflicted. Specifically, CEO pay is higher in firms where
the consultant supplies other business services, or where management
is involved in the selection of the compensation consultant. On the
other hand, there is little evidence that firms switching consultants
are associated with higher CEO pay in the U.S. data. However, the
panel data models were estimated with only a small number of
observed changes in consultants, which may affect the results.
It is important to stress some limitations, especially when
thinking about using the cross-section data to identify consultant
effect on CEO pay. In particular, the retention of the consultant is
endogenous, and missing explanatory variables may plague model
estimation. For example, firms requiring more talented managers-
who would be more highly paid-may have a greater propensity to use
consultants. Alternatively, larger firms with more complex jobs-who
would also have more highly paid executives-may be more likely to
retain consultants. Such examples suggest that the estimated relation
between CEO pay and consultants may be biased due to important
omitted variables from the analysis (for example, managerial
quality).
77
76. The model diagnostics show positive first-order serial correlation (as expected and
required) from the first difference fixed-effect DPD model. Importantly, there is no second-order
correlation.
77. Ideally, to test the causal effect of consultants on CEO pay, one would randomly assign
the compensation consultants to organizations. CEO pay in firms with consultants (the
treatment group) could then be compared to those without (the control group). Randomization
would identify the causal effect of the pay consultants. In reality, though, the assignment of
consultants to client firms is not random, so there will be significant differences in the
characteristics of organizations using consultants-such as size, performance, capabilities, and
personnel. And these differences (a) preclude causal interpretation of the data presented and (b)
suggest the presence of potential statistical biases.
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One potential solution is to perform a propensity score
matching analysis, 78 as in the studies by Armstrong, Ittner, and
Larcker and Murphy and Sandino.79 It can alleviate selection biases
arising from the nonrandom assignment of data. It does so by
optimally matching firms that use consultants (the treatment
condition) to firms that do not use consultants (the control
condition).80 To further investigate the correlation between CEO pay
and consultants, I performed a propensity score analysis, using a
nearest neighbor algorithm.81 I found that the difference between CEO
pay in the treatment group "firms using consultants" was
insignificantly different from those firms in the matched control group
"firms not using consultants." In addition, I found that CEO pay in the
treatment group "consultants supplied other business to the firm" was
insignificantly different from those firms in the matched control group
of "firms that did not supply other business." This is despite the fact
that a positive correlation could be established in the simple linear
regression models. These additional findings suggest that establishing
a statistical relationship between CEO pay and consultants may
indeed be sensitive to the type of method used. However, similar to
Murphy and Sandino, I found the first-stage propensity score models
were often poorly determined, calling into question the efficacy of the
procedure in this particular context.
More generally, the results in this Article, as well as findings
from other contemporary studies, are hampered by the availability of
78. DONALD B. RUBIN, MATCHED SAMPLING FOR CAUSAL EFFECTS 305-07 (2006); James J.
Heckman et al., Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 261,
261-94 (1998); James J. Heckman et al., Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator:
Evidence from a Job Training Programme, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 605, 605-54 (1997); Paul R.
Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational
Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41, 41-55 (1983).
79. Armstrong et al., supra note 50; Murphy & Sandino, supra note 30.
80. In our case, the propensity matching determines the causal effect of a consultant on pay
from the non-random data. Tit E [0, 1] is the treatment indicator variable for firm i at time t. T =
1 if a consultant is used and T = 0 if the consultant is not used. Define Yit(1) as CEO pay if a
consultant is used and Yit(O) if not. The causal effect of the consultant on CEO pay is: Yit(1) -
Yit(O). The fundamental problem of causal inference is that the quantity Yit(O) is not observable;
if a firm used a consultant then the outcome is not observable in the counterfactual state. The
average treatment effect of a consultant on CEO pay can be expressed as:
E [Yit(1) -Yit(0) I Tit = 1] = E[Yit(1) I Tit = 1] - E[Yit (0) 1 Tit = 1].
The counterfactual is then estimated by the average outcome value for firms that did not use
consultants (E [Yit(O) I Tit = 0] using a logit propensity score model). See the Heckman papers
supra note 78.
81. Edwin Leuven & Barbara Sianesi, PSMATCH2: Stata Module to Perform Full
Mahalanobis and Propensity Score Matching, Common Support Graphing, and Covariate
Imbalance Testing, IDEAS DATABASE (Boston Coll. Dep't of Econ., Apr. 17, 2003),
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
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data on compensation consultants. Some of the measures of
"consultant independence" are perhaps less than ideal. However, as
the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act becomes widespread, more
fine-grained measures will become available to researchers, including
information on the fees received by consultants for their various
services. This is likely to facilitate a much better understanding of the
effects of consultants.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Executive compensation is a controversial issue. Popular
opinion, and some academic studies, suggests CEO pay is excessive
and often unrelated to performance.8 2 This Article has focused on
compensation consultants since critics argue they are not sufficiently
independent when making CEO pay recommendations and may lead
to higher pay. The recent Dodd-Frank Act aims to redress some of
these concerns.
This Article surveys some of the more recent evidence linking
CEO pay and compensation consultants. These studies are based on
existing high disclosure regimes, especially the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom. What can be concluded from the
extant research? First, there appears to be a positive correlation
between CEO pay and the presence of compensation consultants.
However, it is often difficult to interpret this finding because of
selection effects, concerns about missing explanatory variables, and
reverse causation. In addition, consultants often bring benefits to the
firm, such as expert advice. As a result, it is not clear that shareholder
interests are adversely affected. Second, there is some support for the
idea that conflicted compensation consultants are associated with
higher CEO pay at client firms. However, the evidence from various
studies is somewhat mixed, suggesting that further research is
warranted. Some studies find that CEO pay is higher when the
consultant supplies other business services to the client firm. Some
research finds higher CEO pay when management is involved in
choosing the compensation consultant, and other research does not.
82. This perspective on CEO pay has been challenged. Core and Guay show that CEO
wealth is strongly linked to the stock market performance of their firms. Core & Guay, supra
note 4; see also Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in
the United States and United Kingdom, 110 ECON. J. 640, 640-71 (2000); John E. Core et al., Is
U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142-85
(2005); Conyon et al., supra note 53; Kaplan, supra note 5. On the optimal provision of benefits in
organizations, see Todd M. Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of
Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 GEO. L.J. 1835, 1840-44 (2005).
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However, as noted, various studies show that these findings may be
sensitive to the type of estimation methods and techniques used.
This Article provides new evidence on the relation between
CEO pay and consultants. Cross-section data from the United
Kingdom show a positive correlation between CEO pay and the
presence of a compensation consultant. There was less evidence,
though, that CEO pay was higher in firms whose consultants supply
other non-executive compensation advice to their clients. Moreover,
there was insignificant evidence that CEO pay was higher if
management appointed the pay consultant. Statistical concerns make
identification of a causal consultant effect on CEO pay particularly
difficult. Also, the evidence showed that switching consultants was not
associated with significantly higher CEO pay. The DPD models, which
cater for unobserved firm fixed effects, failed to identify a robust
positive correlation between changes in compensation consultants and
changes in CEO pay.
It is customary to highlight a few limitations and to suggest
some avenues for further research. First, the empirical evidence
presented here is made possible by the enhanced disclosure
requirements about compensation consultants in the United States
and the United Kingdom. The results should be considered
preliminary because when new data become available, and
researchers can use more advanced statistical methods such as panel
data techniques, richer hypothesis testing will be possible. Second, the
inability to perform randomized tests in the current study means that
the causal effect of consultants on CEO pay cannot be identified. At
present, most studies are observational and report only statistical
associations. This is a challenge for future research. Finally, the
market for executive compensation consultant services is evolving.
The merger between Towers Perrin and Watson Wyatt in early 2010
created a major new presence in the market for compensation
consulting services. An important avenue for future studies is to
understand how this merger and the changing market structure affect
U.S. CEO compensation practices.
Overall, the extant research appears to show a range of
findings on the relation between CEO pay and compensation
consultants. It is difficult to unambiguously conclude, therefore, that
pay consultants simply promote executive interests at the expense of
shareholders, or that pay outcomes and contracts are not optimal.
Indeed, consultants seem to provide valuable expertise and
information to firms. In the future, as the Dodd-Frank Act leads to
greater information for investors and researchers alike, the effects of
consultants on CEO pay will become better known and clearer.
427
428 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 64:2:399
In summary, this Article has provided some initial steps in
stimulating the debate about the role of compensation consultants as
one of the central actors in the executive pay-setting process.
